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Indirect assessments of market conduct have become widespread in the New 
Empirical Industrial Organization-NEIO literature. Recently, Steen and Salvanes 
(1999) provided a flexible dynamic econometric formulation of the approach 
advanced by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). The present paper considers a 
similar approach as applied to regional cement markets in Brazil under more 
favorable data availability and it also attempts to address part of the critiques that 
usually emerge with respect to the NEIO literature. In particular, issues pertaining 
structural stability and yet the control for the number of competing firms are 
addressed. The evidence clearly indicates non-negligible and distinct market 
power in the different regions and yet distinct conduct patterns in the short and 
long-run. 
JEL Classification: L110, L130 
                                                 
* The second author acknowledges the hospitality of the European University Institute during the 
elaboration of the final part of the work. 1. Introduction 
       Empirical assessments of market conduct in the context of unobservable 
marginal costs have become widespread in the recent empirical literature. The 
corresponding identification of the conduct parameter either relies on the 
responsiveness of prices to changes in the elasticity of demand or shifts in costs 
[see e.g. Bresnahan (1989) for an early account on the so-called New Empirical 
Industrial Organization-NEIO]. 
The aforementioned methodologies, however, have been questioned with 
respect to the accurateness of the indirect conduct measurement. At an empirical 
level, works by Aiginger (1995) and Steen and Salvanes (1999) defended the 
possible gains of implementing flexible and dynamic empirical specifications 
despite the usual underlying static oligopoly framework. Those approaches 
attempt at capturing short-run dynamics and implicitly account for dynamic 
effects that could be related to habit formation in demand and adjustment costs 
in supply. 
     Many criticisms have surfaced with regard to NEIO models as exemplified by 
Corts (1999), Sexton and Zhang (2000), Puller (2002) and Kim and Knittel (2004), 
and range from the empirical definition of the relevant market to theoretical 
considerations over the validity of the conduct parameters estimated.  In a 
related vein, direct robustness investigations were undertaken in contexts where 
a simple technology prevailed and related cost information was available, and provided favorable support to the NEIO approach [see Genesove and Mullin 
(1998) and Clay and Troesken (2003)]. 
The purpose of the present paper is to address some of the concerns 
related to the NEIO literature by considering a dynamic econometric model in a 
more favorable context in terms of data availability. In particular, issues 
pertaining structural stability and yet the control for the number of competing 
firms are addressed.  We consider the Brazilian cement industry, with the 
motivation of good data availability and the possibility of different regional 
estimates. This traditional homogeneous oligopoly has been studied extensively 
[see e.g. Lima (1995), Steen and Sǿrgard (1999), Rosenbaum and 
Sukharomana (2001), Roller and Steen (2003), la Cour and Møllgaard (2003), 
and  Salvo (2004)], and this also allows for solid comparison of the estimates.  
The paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces basic 
background to motivate the empirical model to be estimated. The third section 
provides details on the cement sector. The fourth section presents the empirical 
analysis in terms of the data construction, the formulation of the empirical model 
and related estimates. The fifth section brings some final comments. 2. NEIO Models: Basic Conceptual Aspects 
2.1- Introduction 
A typical approach for identifying the conduct parameter in oligopolistic 
markets relies on the responsiveness of prices to changes in the elasticity of 
demand [see e.g. Bresnahan (1989)]. Seminal conceptual contributions 
associated with that approach include Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). A 
starting point is to conceive a generic perceived marginal revenue that depends 
on the conduct parameter θ as given by MR(θ) = p + θ Q dp/dQ, where p and Q 
respectively denote price and quantity Under profit maximization such expression 
is to be equated to the marginal cost and three important cases arise as 
particular cases. If θ = 1 it corresponds to a fully collusive situation. Other salient 
polar case occurs θ = 0 as would be the case in a competitive market. The 
intermediate range of the conduct parameter would include different degrees of 
imperfect competition, in particular θ = 1/n would be consistent with a symmetric 
Cournot oligopoly with n firms 
Under the aforementioned framework the rotation of demand by means of 
the inclusion of an interaction term plays a decisive role on the identification of 
the conduct parameter in a homogeneous oligopoly. The argument advanced by 
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) is by now well established and the demand 
function and supply relation are given respectively by:  
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  A departure from the bulk of the static version of the NEIO model is 
provided by Karp and Perloff (1989), Deodhar and Sheldon (1996), Aiginger 
(1995), and Steen and Salvanes (1999). The last two works, in particular, 
considers a flexible (error correction) dynamic specification for non-stationary 
variables. This paper closely follows Steen and Salvanes (1999) specification.  
At a conceptual level, it is important to stress that NEIO models essentially 
relied on static oligopoly models. The flexibilization implied by the empirical 
dynamic model is therefore mostly justified on the grounds of the capability of 
properly capturing short-run departures from long-run equilibrium rather than a 
strict adherence to the underlying (static) theoretical model in the context of non-
stationarity. 
Since a dynamic version should give more information about the market, 
the approach we will take in developing a NEIO model for the Brazilian cement 
market will incorporate two versions, one static and one dynamic. Following  
Steen and Salvanes (1999) ECM model, the modified demand becomes:   
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θ     with  P, Q and Z respectively indicating 
price, quantity and a demand shifter, whereas the variable PZ reflects an 
interactive term associated with the rotation of the demand necessary for the conduct parameter identification. The existence of an error correction 
representation follows the Granger representation theorem (1981). The result 
legitimates such representation in the context of non-stationary cointegrated I(1) 
variables.  
The Bärsden (1989) transformation ECM is given by: 
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and θp is the long-run effect of P on Q.  
 
The supply relation is transformed to: 
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The price-elasticity of demand (εpp) and income-elasticity (εpz) are 
calculated in the usual way: 
] / ].[ [
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Q P Z pz p pp α α ε + =  and  ] / ].[ [
_ _ _
Q Z P pz p pz α α ε + =  
The static conduct parameter θs and the long-term parameter θL appear in 
equation (4). The rationality is that in the dynamic version there is a static 
measure of market power, with an error correction mechanism that drives the 
market towards equilibrium in the long run and Ψ* is the adjustment parameter of the supply relation – 0 indicates permanent deviation from the short-run 
equilibrium and 1 is instant adjustment 
The empirical analysis follows three steps: 
a)  Consider unit root tests and verify the prevalence of cointegration in the 
case of I(1) variables, where the lag structure of the VAR system should 
be justified in terms of some established criterion (say Akaike information 
criterion); 
b)  Generate (lagged) residuals of the VAR estimation to be used as an error 
correction term in the related representation (assuming cointegration) 
c)  Estimate equations (3) and (4) by means of two stage least squares  
2.2- Critiques to NEIO Models 
 
Critiques to NEIO models can be summarized as follows [see e.g Corts 
(1999), Sheldon and Zhang (2000), Puller (2002) and Kim and Knittel (2004)]: 
i)  Weak economic theory foundation  
Since NEIO models can be related to a conjectural variations framework, 
an indirect critique to NEIO models is that “one aspect that has been discussed 
critically pertains the conceptual underpinning or lack thereof provided by the 
conjectural variations framework.”
1 A partial caveat on that critique is motivated 
by the work of Cabral (1995) that has shown that the conjectural variation model 
can be seen as a reduced form for a simultaneous quantity-setting Cournot 
supergame in the case of a linear demand. In other words, under certain 
conditions the conjectural variation framework provides an approximation for a 
dynamic model. 
                                                 
1 See Sexton and Zhang, (2000), p. 19.  ii)  No treatment of structural changes such as technology 
One very pertinent critique (Sexton and Zhang, 2000) is that most NEIO 
studies have relied on yearly data. To gain enough data points, in some cases 
NEIO models have been estimated with data that spans 30-years, without 
allowing for structural changes or even doing that through simple dummy 
variables. Again, this is not a critique of NEIO models per se, but of specification 
of empirical models used in industrial economics.  
iii)  Difficulties in defining the relevant market definition  
Another critique not applied only to NEIO models is that of relevant market 
definition. Schroeter (1988), for instance, defines the beef market as national, 
even though cattle are seldom shipped as far as 300 miles (Sheldon and Zhang, 
2000).  
iv)  Ad hoc hypothesis on demand and supply variables 
Most of NEIO estimation was undertaken in the context  of one-sided 
market power, i.e., it assumes that market power occurs only on one side of the 
market, and the other side behaves competitively. This may not be the case, with 
markets with market power on demand and supply sides. Some studies 
[Schroeter et al (2000); Gohin and Guyomard (2000)) have dealt with it using 
models that allow market-power on demand and supply.  
v) Inconsistency  of  the conduct parameter  
The most challenging critique of NEIO models is that of Corts (1999). The 
author observes that any structural change on demand or supply variables would 
make the conduct parameter correlated with the instrumental variables necessary for the estimation of the model. Furthermore, Wolfram (1999), Corts 
(1999) and Puller (2002) show that if the firms are efficiently colluding, the model 
estimated is misleading since there is no simultaneous quantity-setting and the 
conduct parameter estimated would understate the true conduct parameter. As a 
result, the model would be only useful to test if the market behaves competitively 
(θ=0), monopolistically (θ=1), or would have a Cournot-equilibrium (θ=1/n, where 
n is the number of firms on the market). In the next sections we detail the 
empirical implementation of the present paper. 
 
3. The Cement Oligopoly 
3.1- The Brazilian cement market. 
The cement industry is commonplace in industrial empirical studies 
because it is considered an archetype homogenous oligopoly. This has the 
benefit of allowing comparisons with the results of many other studies. In fact, 
cement is almost completely a homogeneous product, which allows for a simple 
specification of the demand function and supply relation.  
Also, the cement production involves economies of scale – BNDES (1995); 
large distribution costs – 94.5% of the cement consumed is produced within a 
300 mile radius (Rosembaum and Sukharomana, 2001); and a short shelf-life – 
which does not allow large inventories and makes market interactions much 
more rapid and quantity-setting the norm for firm decision. The industry is mature, 
with few technological improvements, the last important one being the 
introduction of the dry production process in the 70´s (Teixeira et alli, 2003).   Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Brazilian cement market is highly 
concentrated, with Votorantim leading the market with 41.5% in 2002 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE. 
 
 
An aggregate CR4 index, however, would bring little information on the 
market structure due to the spatial distributions of firms and markets - Brazil is 
the 5
th largest country in the world and cement has large distribution costs. Brazil 
has five major regions – Southern, Southeast, Northern, Northeast, and Midwest. 
Not every firm is present in every region, and for the purposes of this paper, we 








The table reveals the spatial distribution of Brazilian firms. Although the 
data is only for year 2002, this distribution has been the same for the last ten 
years, with no new entries or exits in the regional markets. The Northern region 
has only one firm with two industrial units
3, while the Southeast (and richest) 
region have 29 industrial units with 8 firms present. Also, the demand for cement 
                                                 
2 This is supported by a vast literature on the brazilian cement market. (Haguenauer, 1997; Lima, 
1995; BNDES, 1995; Teixeira et alli, 2003). Salvo (2004), however, estimates a model with a 
state regional market. The problem with this is that Brazil has 23 states and inter-state trade 
among frontier states is very relevant to total state consumption, comprising more than 60% in 
some cases (Sindicato Nacional da Indústria de Cimento – SNIC, various years).    
3 It should be noted that although cement is considered a non-tradeable, imports can happen in 
frontier regions. In Brazil’s case, imports only happen on the Northern and Midwest regions, 
which may restrain some market-power of those concentrated markets.   is pulverized and we can safely assume that there is no market power on the 
demand side. This is also supported by the Brazilian cement literature (Cunha 
and Fernandes, 2003). Also, vertical integration is not a relevant concern to two-
sided market-power and is mainly used to reduce costs in the few instances it 
happens (Teixeira et al (2003)). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE. 
 
3.2-  Meeting the Critiques. 
Although most critiques are not directed only to NEIO models, they are still 
pertinent to the empirical models being estimated. We believe that the chosen 
sector enables a more favorable application of the NEIO framework and motivate 
next how some previous concerns are lightened. The NEIO model applied to the 
Brazilian cement market will use monthly data that spans 10 years. In this time-
frame no major technological improvement has occurred (Cunha and Fernandes, 
2003) and extra care will be exercised with the consideration of tests for 
structural breaks. Thus the concerns related to two critiques can be dampened: 
using monthly data is probably the first choice of empirical estimation, and the 
fact that the market has not had major structural changes allows for an unbiased 
estimation.  In relation to the relevant market critique, there is support in the literature 
for a Brazilian regional market
4. To account for it, the estimation is done to each 
region separately, with a conduct parameter for each region.  
The market power is clearly one-sided, with a pulverized demand (shown 
in table 3) that only allows market power on the supply side. Also, the functional 
forms used in estimation, all linear, have support on Genesove and Mullin (1998).   
Corts (1999) critic is also an empirical one. It involves mainly the fact that 
there is a possibility that the conduct parameter presents correlation with the 
instrumental variables used in the estimation, which transforms the conduct 
parameter into an endogenous variable of the system, and thus not explicitly 
identifiable. What we propose is a structural change test to identify changes (if 
any) in the demand function and supply relation which would turn the conduct 
parameter into an endogenous variable. The rationality is that, if the conduct 
parameter is exogenous and constant no structural changes in the market occur 
and the conduct parameter is identifiable and unbiased, and thus Corts (1999) 
critic is met. It should be noted that neither Steen and Salvanes (1999) nor 
Nakane (2002) – the two studies that used the Bärsden (1989) transformation to 
incorporate an ECM into a NEIO model – have undertaken a structural change 
test.    
                                                 
4 There may be doubts as to whether Brazil’s five regions is the best relevant market, or states 
should be grouped in other non-conventional regions (maybe 6 or 7 regions). However, as any 
other grouping would be as ad hoc as the 5 region grouping, and this grouping has support in the 
literature, no other test for best grouping were taken.  The main critic that is theoretical in nature, that of the validity of the 
conduct parameter, is harder to meet. It involves theoretical aspects of industrial 
economics models and its discussion is not in the scope of this work. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that conjectural variance models are a valid way of 
estimating market power. The other theoretical critic, that of the validity of a pure 
econometric version for a NEIO model as the one constructed by Steen and 
Salvanes (1999) is going to be discussed in the section where the results for the 
conduct parameters are presented.  
4. Empirical  Analysis 
4.1- Data Construction 
  The essential ingredients of any NEIO study are price, quantity, demand 
and cost shifters. Quantity prices at each state were obtained from the Brazilian 
manufacturers’ association {Sindicato Nacional da Indústria do Cimento-SNIC} 
on a monthly basis, whereas prices for cement and relevant inputs in each state 
were obtained from the Brazilian statistical bureau [SIDRA-IBGE]. Data spans 12 
years (1991/2002), with 144 data points. The data is complete to all regions in 
the period considered. The descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 1. As 
we considered the relevant market as regional, aggregations were undertaken.  
Q: growth of consumption of Portland cement in tons. for the given region. The 
quantity in each region is readily obtained upon the state figures; 
P: growth of price of the Portland cement (CP-32 50kg). The regional price is 
obtained as a weighted average of the median price at each state where the weights are given by the quantities. The prices are deflated by the general price 
index (IGP from IBGE). 
Wi: The supply instruments are costs instruments from cement production: wages 
(W1), price of calcareous materials (chalk) (W2), and price of sand used in 
cement production (W3). Wages is the hourly wage of the cement industry worker. 
Calcareous materials and sand are prices per kilogram. 
Y: monthly GDP
5. 
Z: index for the construction industry activity. 
 
4.2- Empirical Model 
 
Before the estimation for the static and dynamic versions several tests 
were undertaken. Tests for unit roots revealed that the variables were I(1) 
processes. Cointegration tests were also performed to ensure that a ECM 
formulation was possible. A separability test was necessary since Lau’s (1982) 
impossibility theorem shows that only if the demand is separable the conduct 
parameter can be identified. A test to determine the lag of each variable was also 
performed based on Akaike (1979). All results are presented in the appendix. 
Finally, to meet Corts (1999) critique and establish that the conduct 
parameters estimated are stable and could be considered unrelated to the 
variables in the estimation procedures two structural change tests have been 
used, the regular Chow test and the recursive Chow test. The first test separate 
the T observations in half, estimating two separate demand function and testing 
                                                 
5 The model can be estimated with only one variable representing the Z variable (Steen and 
Salvanes, 1999). We chose another demand variable, Y, to improve the estimation, as many 
previous works did (Steen and Salvanes, 1999, Alexander, 1988).  for changes in the structure. The second test is more encompassing in nature: 
first it is estimated the demand function with n observations, with subsequent 
estimation of the demand function with n+1, n+2, … T. In both cases it is used a 
F-test statistic with an associated probability of structural stability. In the present 
work we conducted the test on the more general dynamic version of the demand 
function, since if there is a long-term stability derived from the dynamic version it 
is safe to assume the some from the static version. From  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE. 
 
 it can be concluded that for both tests the demand is structurally stable 
and thus the conduct parameter estimated can be considered an exogenous 
variable and thus an unbiased estimate of the average market-power of firms on 
the regional Brazilian cement market.  
 
 




All the above mentioned tests confirmed that estimation of the static and 
dynamic versions was possible, since the variables were separable, had unit 
roots I(1), and cointegration prevailed. 
 We summarize the relevant estimation results of both static and dynamic 
versions in table 5.   
 INSERT TABLE 5 HERE. 
 
 
The two main parameters are θS and θL, and respectively denote the 
short-run and long-run conduct parameters
6. The latter is estimated only in the 
dynamic version of the NEIO model. εpp and εpz are the price-elasticity and 
income elasticity of demand. Ψ* is the adjustment parameter estimated in the 
dynamic version. The Cournot value is a comparative measure of the conduct 
parameter from symmetric Cournot oligopoly, which is 1/n, where n is the number 
of firms  
In the first row there are the static and dynamic conduct parameters for 
both version of the NEIO model. It was expected that the parameters would be 
close if both specifications were the best ones for the market.  In this case there 
is no difference between a short-run and a long-run equilibrium, since there is a 
new equilibrium each stage (in our case, a month). The average market-power 
found in the static version of the NEIO model is, then, the average result of the 
firms behavior in the market in the period considered. Although Steen and 
Salvanes (1999) find the dynamic version superior, we conclude that there is no 
a priori better version and thus we estimate both versions of the model
7.  
 
                                                 
6 Short-run conduct parameter is a wrong definition for the conduct parameter estimated from the 
static version of the model. However, since the dynamic version has a short and long-run 
parameter conduct with the short-run conduct parameter having the same notation as the static 
conduct parameter, for the sake of simplicity we will call the conduct parameter of the static 
version a short-run conduct parameter.  
7 As also Steen and Salvanes (1999) did. However, they dismissed the static result saying that it 
did not fit expectations for the salmon market.  The results from both specifications do not present enough evidence to 
conclude that either one is a superior version. Comparing the short-run result of 
both versions, we find that in all regions the dynamic version’s conduct 
parameter is less than the static version’s. Also, the conduct parameters for the 
Midwest and Southern regions are particularly different - 0.880 and 0.739, 
respectively for the static version, with 0.127 and 0.217 for the dynamic version. 
Market power appears to be more significant in the static rather than in the 
dynamic version,  
Moreover, two important conclusions are common to both versions of the 
model: the conduct parameters are different in each region which makes it clear 
that there is no national market ; and there is no perfect competition behavior in 
any regional market because no interval conduct parameter – static or dynamic – 
allows it, which is expected due to the fact that cement is considered an 
archetypical oligopoly. It is also important to notice that for most regions the 
conduct – in both static and dynamic versions of the model - is correlated to the 
number of industrial units– more units means that firms behave, on the average, 
more competitively. The exception is the dynamic short-run conduct parameter of 
the Midwest and Southern regions, where a parameter near 0 was not expected 
due to the fact that only 3 and 4 firms, respectively, are present on those markets. 
It is interesting to note that in the Northern region, with only one firms and two 
industrial units, neither the interval for the short-run conduct parameter of the 
static ]0.957;0.701[ and dynamic ]0.670;0.268[ versions, nor the interval for the 
long-run conduct parameter  ]0.785;0.379[ of the dynamic version contemplate a monopolistic behavior. This is probably due to imports from neighbour countries 
like Venezuela – even though cement is usually a non-tradeable good, imports 
can happen in frontier regions. 
It was expected that the estimated long-run conduct parameters of the 
dynamic version would be lower than the short-run parameters. Economic theory 
explains it on the basis firms behave collusevily in the short-run but there are not 
enough barriers of entry to prevent at least some competition on the long run. 
However, that was not the case for the Northern, Northeast and Midwest regions.  
The Ψ* adjustment parameter should be in the interval between -1 and 0 
(Steen and Salvanes, 1999, p. 166). Thus a 0.978 adjustment parameter to the 
North region means a 97.8% adjustment after deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium in the supply relation. For the Southern and Midwest regions, 
however,  Ψ* is lower than -1, -1.644 and -2.509 respectively. There is no 
economic explanation for this overshooting.  
The evidence is consistent with a Cournot equilibrium is present in the 
intervals for all the conduct parameters for the Northeast region, and the short-
run conduct parameters of both static and dynamic versions for the Southeast 
region. This result is interesting as it is related to the strong analytical support for 
Cournot behavior on those markets. Also, the market where the firms behave 
more competitively is the Southeast region, with small conduct parameter for 
both versions, which is expected due to the fact that it is where most firms are 
present, 8, and is the richest region of Brazil, and thus naturally brings more 
competition. To test for Cournot equilibrium in both the Northeast and Southeast regions, we formulate a simple t-test (following Steen and Salvanes, 1999) with 
the null hypotheis H0 : θ = 1/n and H1: θ ≠ 1/n. At a 5% significance level we 
accept the H0 hypothesis for both markets and thus can conclude that Cournot 
equilibrium is the short-run solution for the Northeast and Southeast regions. The 
same test applied for the South and Middlewest regions, and a similar test for the 
North region with H0 : θ = 1 have resulted in the rejection of all the null hypothesis, 
which means that the North regions does not behave monopolistically nor 
Cournot equilibrium is a solution for the other regions.   
Another important observation then is that the results for both versions of 
the models are robust for the Northern, Northeast and Southeast regions, with 
indefinite conclusion other than the presence of market-power for the Southern 
and Midwest regions. There is no definite conclusion on which version fits best 
the analytical framework of those markets, although the dynamic version gives 
interesting information of possible long-run collusion on the selected markets.  
 
5. Final Comments 
The main goals of this paper were  to meet recent critiques to NEIO 
models and improve empirical procedures to NEIO models to verify its 
robustness.  
Most NEIO critiques are related to the estimation procedures, and thus 
could be met because the estimation procedures for the Brazilian cement 
regional markets were done under a much more favourable scenario in terms of 
data availability. Also, determining a regional relevant market and estimating conduct parameters for each region gave better insights than a single parameter 
could.  
To meet the most challenging critique, that of Corts (1999), a structural 
change test was considered. The evidence indicates that no structural change 
occurred in any region for the selected period and thus those parameters could 
safely be considered exogenous and uncorrelated with the instruments used to 
estimate it.  
Two versions – one static and another dynamic – of the model were 
estimated. It was found that for every region the short-run static conduct 
parameter was larger than either the short-run or long-run dynamic conduct 
parameter, with the exception of the long-run conduct parameter for the 
Northeast region.  
Using regional markets was important because it allowed for good 
comparisons of the results, with a potentially more collusive behavior being 
expected in regions with less firms operating. The results are consistent with 
those expectations for the most part. The conduct parameters were higher in the 
Northern region – where only one firm operates, while in the Southeast region, 
with the larger number of firms operating, all conduct parameter were indicative 
of a smaller degree of market power as compared to the other regions. It should 
be noted that all conduct parameters indicated non-negligible market power in all 
the regions, as expected for an archetypical oligopoly market such as cement. 
It is important to notice that there are no indications that the dynamic 
specification is the superior one, as would be normally expected (Steen and Salvanes, 1999). All results from the static and dynamic specification are 
consistent with a significant market power and are, for the most part, in direct 
correlation with the number of firms operating in each region. Interestingly, some 
results are compatible with a Cournot equilibrium – specifically, both short-run 
equilibrium for the static and dynamic versions for the Northeast and Southeast 
regions.  
Possible extensions in terms of similar frameworks relate to at least three 
research lines. First, one should consider an explicitly dynamic theoretical model 
that would provide sound foundations for the flexible empirical approach 
considered in this paper. Second, similar developments for the case of 
differentiated oligopolies would be pertinent and the work of Nevo (1998) could 
be a useful starting point. Finally, one should be interested not only in detecting 
the prevalence of market power but also in identifying its source. In that sense, 
the association of the conduct parameter with other relevant variables through a 
latent structure could be relevant [see e.g. McCluskey and Quagrainie (2004)]. 
All those avenues of research, however, extrapolate the scope of the present 
paper and are therefore left for future research.  
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Table 1 – The Brazilian National Cement Market – 2002 – tons. 
Company  2002 ton  % in 2002 
Votorantim 15.773.818 41,5% 
Nassau 4.704.709  12,4% 
Cimpor 3.761.539  9,9% 
Holcim 3.316.283  8,7% 
Camargo Côrrea  3.056.974  8,0% 
Lafarge 2.660.662  7,0% 
CP–Cimento 1.942.230  5,1% 
Soeicom 1.115.731  2,9% 
Itambé 884.910  2,3% 
Ciplan 810.460  2,1% 
Total 38.027.316 100,0% 
         Font: SNIC, 2002.  
Table 2 - The Brazilian Regional Cement Market – 2001/02 – tons. 
Industrial Companies  2001   2002  % 2002  Ind. units 
Northern    
Nassau 1.183.077 1.188.445 100,0%  2 
TOTAL NORTHERN  1.183.077 1.188.445   2 
Northeast    
Nassau 2.072.391 2.289.506 31,2%  6 
Votorantim 3.406.684 3.324.786 45,3%  3 
Lafarge 364.477 121.073 1,6%  1 
Cimpor 1.396.834 1.610.792 21,9%  4 
TOTAL NORTHEAST  7.240.386 7.346.157   14 
Midwest    
Votorantim 2.142.641 2.065.152 50,8%  3 
Ciplan 735.699 810.460 19,9%  1 
Camargo Côrrea  511.666 463.056 11,4%  1 
Cimpor 730.569 730.194 17,9%  1 
TOTAL MIDWEST  4.120.575 4.068.862   6 
Southeast    
Votorantim 6.065.857 5.678.227 29,7%  7 
Nassau 1.272.971 1.226.758 6,4%  1 
Cimpor 669.626 657.341 3,4%  1 
Holcim 3.514.554 3.316.283 17,4%  5 
Camargo Côrrea  2.732.073 2.593.918 13,6%  4 
Lafarge 2.703.485 2.539.589 13,3%  6 
Soeicom 1.143.901 1.115.731 5,8%  1 
CP – Cimento  2.012.737 1.942.230 10,2%  4 
TOTAL SOUTHEAST  20.115.204 19.109.258   29 
Southern    
Votorantim 4.680.141 4.705.653 74,5%  4 
Cimpor 721.636 724.031 11,5%  2 
Itambé 877.463 884.910 14,0%  1 
TOTAL SOUTHERN  6.279.240 6.314.594   7 
Total Brasil  38.938.482 38.027.316   58 
Fonte: SNIC, 2002.  
Table 3 – Cement consumer profile in 2002 - % of total consumption. 
  Consumer North  Northeast Middlewest Southeast South  Avrge 
1  Individuals Distributors  83.91%  79.37% 71.60% 67.87% 62.62%  70.33% 
2  Industrial Consumers  10.35%  10.03% 17.87% 24.96% 31.01%  21.80% 
i Concrete  Firms  6.57%  6.98% 11.81%  14.98%  15.28%  12.82% 
ii Fibrocement  2.81%  0.45% 2.58% 1.79%  6.54%  2.47% 
iii Pre-Mold  0.73%  2.09% 1.69% 3.37%  2.57%  2.70% 
iv Other  0.23%  0.52% 1.79% 4.83%  6.63%  3.81% 
3  Final Consumers  5.75%  10.60% 10.54%  7.16% 6.36% 7.87% 
i  Real estate developers  5.75% 10.57%  10.00%  6.98% 6.23%  7.70% 
ii  State and Federal  0.00%  0.02% 0.31% 0.15%  0.11%  0.13% 
iii Municipalities  0.00%  0.00% 0.22% 0.03%  0.03%  0.04% 
Total   100.00% 100.00%  100.00% 100.00%  100.00% 100.00%
Font: Cunha and Fernandez, 2003.  
  
Table 4 – Results for the two Chow Structural Change tests. 
Region Regular  Chow  Recursive Chow 
 F-test  P-value  F-test P-value. 
Northern 0.015172  0.999916 0.0000977 0.992128 
Northeast 0.017190  0.999885  0.0010160  0.974623 
Southeast 0.000116 1.000000  0.0000066  0.997946 
Southern 0.004281  0.999996  0.0001170  0.991395 
Midwest 0.000372  1.000000 0.0000073 0.997850 
    
Table 5 – Relevant results of static and dynamic versions of a NEIO model 
applied to the regional cement markets in Brazil.  
Northern Northeast  Southeast Southern  Midwest 
 
static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic 
θs  0.829 0.469 0.303 0.188 0.213 0.095 0.739 0.217 0.880 0.127 
st.dev.  (0.128) (0.201) (0.082) (0.065) (0.101) (0.072) (0.105) (0.028) (0.098) (0.045) 
p-value.  0.023 0.001 0.031 0.004 0.041 0.011 0.018 0.009 0.038 0.021 
θL  - 0.582 - 0.361 - 0.057 - 0.154 - 0.448 
st.dev.  - (0.203) - (0.102) - (0.022) - (0.031) - (0.070) 
p-value.  - 0.012 - 0.031 - 0.018 - 0.002 - 0.012 
εpp  -0.103 -0.274 -0.139 -0.069 -0.471 -0.098 -0.184 -0.106 -0.518 -0.622 
εpz  0.498 0.131 1.223 0.914 0.831 0.742 0.302 1.648 0.601 0.650 
Ψ*  - -0.978 - -0.486 - -0.373 - -1.644 - -2.509 
R
2 aj.dem  0.445 0.914 0.524 0.816 0.679 0.935 0.518 0.754 0.409 0.638 
R
2 aj.sup  0.568 0.817 0.603 0.659 0.622 0.764 0.604 0.717 0.436 0.558 
Cournot  1.000 1.000 0.250 0.250 0.125 0.125 0.333 0.333 0.250 0.250 
 Appendix 1 : Summary statistics. 
 
Region Variable  P  Q  W1 W 2 W 3 Y  PZ  Z 
 Mean  19.463  119,733 2.764 17.507 0.461 3,141,768 1,881 103.870
 Min  14.537  53,423 2.200 14.423 0.343 2,669,001 1,468 79.038
Northern  Max 24.887  220,555 3.606 22.609 0.621 3,922,982 2,366 133.950
  St-Dev 1.399  45,732 0.231 1.290 0.039 317,885 186 11.171
  Var 1.958  2,091*10
6 0.053 1.663 0.002 10,105*10
6 34,435 184.791
      
  Mean 18.297  444,493 3.337 21.788 0.355 3,164,485 1,769 100.453
  Min 13.888  217,465 2.552 16.917 0.268 2,946,202 1,309 70.453
Northeast  Max 24.634  1,071,275 4.663 28.944 0.471 3,922,982 2,382 117.532
  St-Dev 1.657  143,748 0.320 1.659 0.029 178,042 199 13.160
  Var 2.744  20,663*10
6 0.102 2.751 0.001 31,698*10
6 39,657 144.693
      
  Mean 18.117  1,510,668 5.242 31.808 0.221 3,557,808 1,751 99.432
  Min 14.382  923,010 4.109 27.527 0.185 3,378,829 1,342 72.723
Southeast  Max 23.891  2,038,296 6.739 40.105 0.277 4,376,456 2,168 116.345
  St-Dev 1.430  309,137 0.409 2.199 0.015 198,654 176 11.618
  Var 2.045  95,565*10
6 0.168 4.835 0.000 39,463*10
6 30,977 154.121
      
  Mean 16.937  463,252 3.762 24.017 0.160 3,668,924 1,636 97.075
  Min 14.599  311,814 2.703 20.952 0.124 3,475,883 1,250 69.260
Southern  Max 23.538  630,072 4.766 30.178 0.231 4,525,276 2,007 123.950
  St-Dev 1.236  85,262 0.303 1.444 0.013 207,199 152 11.171
  Var 1.528  7,269*10
6 0.092 2.086 0.000 42,931*10
6 23,049 124.791
      
  Mean 17.546  222,415 3.744 30.525 0.224 3,164,485 1,695 98.668
Midwest  Min 14.398  127,857 2.982 26.016 0.121 2,946,202 1,271 70.652
  Max 32.345  339,000 4.862 39.622 0.368 3,922,982 2,645 125.437
 St-Dev  1.711  47,663 0.306 2.151 0.025 178,042 184 12.288
 Var  2.927  2,271*10
6 0.094 4.627 0.001 31,698*10
6 33,779 150.997
  
Appendix 2 : Unit Roots test.  
 
Two tests for unit roots were performed, ADF2 and ADF3. Critical values are 
2,89 and 3,40, respectively, and thus all variables are I(1) processes.  
   ADF2  ADF  3 
 Variable  OLS  t-stat p-value  OLS  t-stat p-value 
W1  -0.2533 -2.1557 0.22000  -0.3843 -2.4351 0.36000 
W2  -0.2276 -1.7278 0.41000  -0.4220 -2.1367 0.52000 
W3  -0.2973   -2.0612 0.26000  -0.5428 -2.6452 0.26000 
P  -0.1233 -1.5020 0.53000  -0.2494   -1.9104 0.65000 
Q  0.0034  0.1119 0.97000  -0.2399 -2.1223 0.53000 
Y  -0.0999 -1.7254 0.41000  -0.2074   -2.5464 0.30000 
Northern 
Z  -0.1191   -1.9713  0.30000  -0.1682   -1.9299  0.64000 
W1  -0.3209   -1.9676  0.30000  -0.6716   -2.9774  0.14000 
W2  -0.1944 -1.5152 0.52000  -0.3683 -1.9727 0.61000 
W3  -0.2375 -1.7869 0.39000  -0.4619 -2.5225 0.31000 
P  -0.2205 -1.6519 0.45000  -0.6056 -3.0191 0.13000 
Q  -0.0887 -1.9077 0.33000  -0.2756  -3.461 0.04000 
Y  -0.0994 -1.6930 0.43000  -0.2008 -2.3917 0.38000 
Northeast 
Z  -0.1296   -1.8938  0.45000  -0.1825   -1.9669  0.49000 
W1  -0.2026 -1.8911 0.34000  -0.3944 -2.7925 0.20000 
W2  -0.1304 -1.4495 0.56000  -0.281 -2.2446 0.46000 
W3  -0.175 -1.7034 0.42000  -0.356 -2.4637 0.34000 
P  -0.1599 -1.6961 0.43000  -0.3478 -2.5568 0.30000 
Q  -0.0645 -2.1884 0.21000  -0.0908 -1.7202 0.74000 
Y  -0.1014 -1.8401 0.36000  -0.2042 -2.6001 0.28000 
Southeast 
Z  -0.1941   -1.7356  0.36000  -0.1292   -1.9075  0.43000 
W1  -0.1912 -2.0479 0.27000  -0.3671 -2.9517 0.15000 
W2  -0.1456 -1.6087 0.47000  -0.3172 -2.5115 0.32000 
W3  -0.3109 -2.1122 0.24000  -0.5763 -2.8899 0.17000 
P  -0.1435 -1.8257 0.37000  -0.2893 -2.5725 0.29000 
Q  -0.1638 -1.0174 0.94000  -0.0641 -1.4851 0.54000 
Y  -0.2128 -2.5978 0.28000  -0.1064 -1.8532 0.35000 
Southern 
Z  -0.1077   -1.9855  0.33000  -0.1223   -2.0293  0.39000 
W1  -0.1739  -1.752 0.40000  -0.3504 -2.5927 0.28000 
W2  -0.1925 -1.8631 0.35000  -0.3561  -2.567 0.30000 
W3  -0.2375 -1.7869 0.39000  -0.4619 -2.5225 0.31000 
P  -0.2533 -1.7601 0.40000  -0.5409 -2.7759 0.21000 
Q  -0.0222 -0.4998 0.89000  -0.6513 -2.8217 0.19000 
Y  -0.0994 -1.6930 0.43000  -0.2008 -2.3917 0.38000 
Midwest 
Z  -0.2019   -1.7833  0.39000  -0.1722   -2.0105  0.57000 
  
Appendix 3: Akaike (1989) test to determine the lag of each variable.  
Northern Northeast  Southeast  Southern  Midwest  Variável 
Def.  Stat.  Def.  Stat.  Def.  Stat.  Def.  Stat.  Def.  Stat. 
W1  3 -3.16  2  -2.257  6 -1.74 5  -2.748  5  -2.629 
W2  6 0.382  2 0.813 5 1.138 3  0.233  2  0.979 
W3  2 -6.621  4 -7.243 4 -7.392 5  -8.837  3  -7.245 
PZ  6 10.403  5 10.550 5 10.159 5  9.870  2  10.517 
Q*  1 -0.105  1 1.696 1 0.460 2  0.218  4  2.498 
P  8 5.672  2 0.797 3 0.266 3  -0.229  3  0.876 
Q  9 19.193  2 22.277 6 23.561 2  21.22  6  20.058 
Y  1  22.8 1 22.84 1  0.46  2  -0.152  4  1.405 
Z  6  3.744 8 10.498 5 10.159 5 9.87 1  10.439 
  
Appendix 4: Johansen’s cointegration test for the demand and supply relation. 
 
Demand. 
r  Northern Northeast Southeast Southern Midwest Crit.  value  5% 
0 312.3 133.9 115.7 109.1 131.3  33.3 
1 118.8 103.2  91.4  69.9  87.6  27.3 
2  47.7 33.7 34.1 36.6 35.2  21.3 
3  18.9 18.5 22.6 19.1 11.2  14.6 
4  3.4* 6.2* 4.2* 6.8* 6.8*  12.1* 
 
Supply Relation. 
r  Northern Northeast Southeast Southern Midwest  Crit.  value.5% 
0 174.9 134.3 197.5 134.7  142  33.3 
1 127.7 113.3 137.9 102.8 135.9  27.3 
2  99.3 84.2 61.3 91.1  101.8  21.3 
3  41.4 65.1 34.8 35.6 26.8  14.6 
4 3.3* 10.3* 7.1*  9.9* 10.2*  12.1 
  
Appendix 5: Separability Test.  
Northern Northeast Southeast Southern  Midwest  Crit..  value.5% 
278.52  49.06 73.74 68.93  81.93 9.49 
 
 